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adequately protect the taxpayer against the inherent advantages of the IRS
resulting from its overwhelming size and power.
CONCLUSION

Because Congress and the courts have consistently upheld the broad investigative power of the IRS, the taxpayer should have stronger safeguards
against abuse. Although the adversary hearing generally provided is admittedly a proper vehicle for protecting the taxpayer from an overzealous IRS
agent, the protection offered is often illusory. Although the courts protect
individual rights in most other areas of the law, 223 they have continually per-

mitted the IRS almost unlimited summons authority.2 24 While the valid
governmental interest in enforcement of the internal revenue laws is strictly
upheld by the courts, recognition of taxpayer rights is long overdue. By
allowing the taxpayer more reasonable 225 pre-hearing discovery, the judiciary
could appropriate these interests more evenly to achieve a proper balance
between the taxpayer's right to privacy and due process and the governmental interest in the expedient collection of internal revenue.
A. ANNE OWENS

THE BRADY DOCTRINE IN FLORIDA
INTRODUCTION

The prosecutor's constitutional duty' to disclose evidence2 favorable to the
accused is one of the most significant features of modern criminal discovery.3
223. One example is the well known right to privacy. See Carey v. Population Serv.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
US. 479 (1965).
224. The recent congressional enactment of I.R.C. §7609, which permits taxpayer intervention when a third party summons is issued, is an exception granting the taxpayer a
much needed right.
225. See text accompanying notes 219-222 supra.
1. The prosecutorial duty to disclose evidence favorable to an accused is mandated by the
due process provisions of the federal and state constitutions. U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV, §1;
FLA. CONST. art. I, §9. Disclosure of information in the interest of fairness is the result, according to some commentators and courts, of an inherent imbalance of investigative capabilities between the accused and the state. See Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to
Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136, 142-50 (1964).
2. "Favorable" evidence is usually distinguished from "exculpatory" evidence and includes
a wide range of information which may be useful to the defendant in preparing for trial. See
Fahringer, Has Anyone Here Seen Brady?: Discovery in Criminal Cases, 9 CaM.L. BULL. 325,
329 (1974); see also notes 141-142 infra and accompanying text.
3. Comment, The Prosecutor'sDuty of Disclose [sic]: From Brady to Agurs and Beyond,
69 J. CriM. L. & C. 197 (1978). The question of what information must be disclosed by
the prosecution to satisfy due process arises in every criminal case. Id. at 197. The United
States Supreme Court recognized the growing importance of disclosure in Dennis v. United
States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966): "[there is a] growing realization that disclosure, rather than
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This prosecutorial disclosure requirement, known as the "Brady doctrine" after
the United States Supreme Court decision in Brady v. Maryland,4 has prompted
a substantial amount of litigation in both federal5 and states courts. Confusion
among these courts as to the types of information discoverable under Bradf
led the Supreme Court to reexamine the prosecutorial disclosure duty in a
series of opinionss culminating in 19769 with United States v. Agurs.' 0 That
decision described several types of situations involving suppression and the
applicable standards of materiality governing disclosure in each category. 1'
Even after Agurs, however, the precise scope of the Brady doctrine remains un2
defined.1
In Florida, a traditional de-emphasis on criminal discovery's caused limited
used of Brady4 until the 1972 adoption of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. 5 The criminal discovery provisions's of the Rules and the decision in
Agurs have stimulated Florida practitioners to more closely evaluate the disclosure requirements of Brady as a constitutional discovery tool. 7

This note examines the federal origins of the Brady doctrine 8 and its development in Florida as a discovery device. 1' Particular emphasis is placed on

suppression, of relevant materials ordinarily promotes the proper administration of criminal
justice." Id. at 870.
4. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
5. See Note, The Prosecutor'sDuty to Discolse After United States v. Agurs, 1977 U. ILL.
L. F. 690, 691 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Prosecutor'sDuty]; Note, The United States
Court of Appeals: 1975-1976 Term, Criminal Law and Procedure, 65 GEo. L.J. 203, 320-24
(1976).
6. See Comment, Suppression: The Prosecutor'sFailure to Disclose Evidence Favorable to
the Defense, 7 U.S.F.L. REv. 348, 384-88 (1973). California, receptive to the doctrine of
prosecutorial disclosure, has advanced it into several frontier areas in criminal discovery. See
generally Comment, Prosecutor'sDuty to Expose Exculpatory Evidence to the Grand jury, 27
CASE IV.Rs. L. REv. 580 (1977); Comment, People v. Rutherford: The Prosecutor'sDuty to
Disclose, 6 GOLDEN GATE U. L. Rav. 851 (1976).
7. The "Brady doctrine," for purposes of this note, refers to that line of cases initiated
in 1935 with Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) and ending most recently with United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
8. See text accompanying notes 22-72 infra.
9. United States v. Agurs was decided 13 years after Brady. The general Brady doctrine,
initiated with Mooney v. Holohan, is over 40 years old.
10. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
11. See text accompanying notes 53-67 infra.
12. See text accompanying notes 73-77 infra.
13. Datz, Discovery in Criminal Procedure, 16 U. FLA. L. Ray. 163 (1963). See also Note,
Discovery in CriminalProceedings,13 U. FLA. L. Ray. 242 (1960): "On the criminal side of the
docket, however, discovery is generally frowned upon if not openly discouraged." Id. at 242.
14. Florida supreme court decisions citing Brady first appeared in the early 1970's.
15. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1975).
16. FLA. R. Cam. P. 3.220. See text accompanying notes 218-227 infra.
17. A number of Florida decisions on Brady-related issues have been rendered in the postAgurs period. This note examines Florida case law through November, 1978,
18. See text accompanying notes 22-77 infra.

19. See text accompanying notes 78-148 infra,
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the areas of Brady practice still problematical after Agurs.20 The note con21
cludes with suggestions for effective use of the disclosure duty in Florida.
FrDERAL ORIGINS OF THE Brady DOCTRINE

The Brady doctrine originated in a series of United States Supreme Court
decisions which established that a prosecutor cannot induce, 22 knowingly use,s
or fail to correct 24 perjured testimony to win a conviction. The first of these
decisions was Mooney v. Holohan.25 That 1935 opinion best exemplifies the
Supreme Court's rationale in dealing with the perjury series of decisions, several of which involved not only the state's knowledge and use of false testimony
but also the prosecution's suppression of favorable evidence.2 6
Mooney v. Holohan involved the first degree murder conviction of a labor
radical and alleged anarchist, Tom Mooney. His prosecution resulted from a
bombing at a San Francisco Preparedness Day Parade. 27 Mooney claimed on
20. See text accompanying notes 149-227 infra.
21. See text accompanying notes 228-243 infra.
22. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). See text accompanying notes 25-31 infra.
23. Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). Pyle reaffirmed the Mooney decision. Petitioner
Pyle was a state prisoner who filed a pro se habeas corpus petition to the United States
Supreme Court. Pyle stated that state officials knowingly presented perjured testimony to a
jury which ultimately convicted him of murder and robbery. Such perjured testimony was
allegedly gained by coercion and threats of the state. Petitioner also asserted that the prosecutor suppressed evidence favorable to the defense. Id. at 214-15. The Court held that the
state's knowing use of perjured testimony violated the due process clause. Id. at 216.
Notably, the Court decided both Mooney and Pyle on the basis of the petitioners' pleadings
alone; the respondents failed to rebut the petitioners' allegations of knowing and intentional
prosecutorial use of perjured testimony. In Pyle, the petitioner was entitled by the Court's
decision to an evidentiary hearing on remand at which the allegations of perjury were to be
examined by the lower court. Id.
24. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957). The
Alcorta Court recognized a duty to correct perjured testimony. The petitioner, convicted of
murder, admitted that he had killed his wife but asserted that he had done so in the heat of
passion when he found her kissing another man. 355 U.S. at 28-29. The alleged lover testified
at trial that he was only a friend of the petitioner's wife, in contradiction to his previous
testimony to the prosecutor that he and the petitioner's wife had often had sexual intercourse.
Id. at 29-31. The prosecutor's intentional failure to correct that false testimony was held to
be reversible error that required a new trial insofar as the prosecutorial misconduct violated
the petitioner's right to a fair trial. The Court emphasized that the witness had given the
jury a "false impression" and that, in addition to impeachment value, the correct testimony
would have tended to corroborate the petitioner's testimony. Id. at 30-32.
The Supreme Court's developing perjury standard was further extended in Napue. A key
state witness falsely testified that he had not received prosecutorial promises of consideration
for his testimony. 360 U.S. at 267-68. The Court held that the prosecutor's intentional failure
to correct this perjured trial testimony that related to the credibility of a state witness tainted
the conviction and required a new trial, insofar as "[t]he jury's estimate of the truthfulness
and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence." Id. at 269.
25. 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
26. See note 23 supra. Both Mooney and Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942), involved the
knowing use of perjured evidence and the suppression of evidence favorable to the defendant.
Both cases were decided upon the perjury issue.
27. See Note, supra note 1, at 136-37, for a discussion and citations of the unusual facts
presented in Mooney.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1979

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 4
1979]

BRADY DOCTRINE IN FLORIDA

appeal that the prosecution had fabricated the charges against him. In fact,
every one of the state's witnesses had lied. The district attorneys were aware of
this perjury and actually assisted in the creation of false testimony by the state
witnesses. Furthermore, the prosecution had intentionally suppressed evidence
which eroded the credibility of state witnesses and which would have benefitted the defense. 28 In reversing Mooney's conviction29 the Court focused on
prosecutorial misconduct in the creation of false testimony and state acquiescence in the presentation of perjured evidence.30 The prosecutorial misconduct
tainted the integrity of the judicial system; the state's suppression of favorable
evidence, on the other hand, violated the individual's due process rights.3 '
Brady v. Maryland-2 represented a marked shift in the Supreme Court's
analysis of problems of prosecutorial misconduct by concentrating on the
prejudice to a defendant rather than on the actions of a prosecutor. 3 In Brady,
28. 294 U.S. at 110-11. The Court issued a rule to show cause why leave to file Petitioner
Mooney's original writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. The state's response did not
put in issue any of the facts alleged by the petitioner and was in the nature of a demurrer,
asserting that petitioner did not raise a federal question and that his petition should be
denied. Id. at 111. The basis of the state's position was that the actions of a prosecuting attorney could not alone violate due process. Id. at 111-12. The Court disagreed. See note 31

infra and accompanying text.
29. 294 US. at 112. The Court found that petitioner had not applied to the state court
for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds stated in the petition before the Court. Because
"[t]hat corrective judicial process [was] not ... invoked" and was not demonstrated to be unavailable, "[o]rderly procedure ... requires that before this Court is asked to issue a writ of
habeas corpus ... recourse should be had to whatever judicial remedy afforded by the State
may still remain open." Id. at 115. Thus, leave to file the petition was denied without
prejudice. Id.
30. See Note, supra note 1, at 136-37, which states that "[n]o significance should be placed
on its [the Court's] failure to mention the suppression of evidence favorable to the defendant.
The suppression was as much a part of the 'deliberate deception (of court and jury]' as the use
of perjured evidence." Id. at 137. Thus, in a similar situation the Court noted: "Petitioner's
papers . . . set forth allegations that his imprisonment resulted from perjured testimony,
knowingly used by the State authorities to obtain his conviction and from the deliberate
suppression by those same authorities of evidence favorable to him. These allegations sufficiently charge a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution...
Pyle v.
Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1942). See notes 23 and 26 supra and accompanying text. The
Supreme Court, however, did not specifically rest a decision upon the suppression theory
rather than the perjury theory until Brady. See note 33 infra and accompanying text.
31. The Mooney Court highlighted the deceptive aspect of perjury in its opinion: "[due
process] . . . cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a State has
contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means
of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the
presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a state to procure the
conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of
justice .... " 294 U.S. at 112 (1935) (emphasis added). See Note, The Duty of the Prosecutor
to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 60 COLUm. L. Rav. 858, 861-66 (1960); Comment, Brady v.
Maryland and the Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose, 40 U. Cm. L. Ray. 112, 114 (1972).
32. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
33. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 n.10 (1976); see also Comment, Prosecutor's
Duty to Disclose Reconsidered, United States v. Agurs, 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976), 1976 WASH. U.
L.Q. 480, 482-83 (1976). The Brady Court's adoption of a fair trial concept that focused upon
the due process right of the accused ratified a development that had been taking place in the
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the defendant was convicted of first degree murder. 34 After trial, defendant's
lawyer learned of an extrajudicial confession in which an accomplice admitted to the actual killing. 35 The statement had been suppressed despite a
pretrial request by defendant to allow examination of all the accomplice's
extrajudicial statements. 36 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Maryland Court of Appeals, 37 holding that "the suppression by the prosecution
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 38s
Brady's significance lies, in part, in the unarticulated proposition that a
defendant cannot receive a fair trial when he is denied access to the evidence
necessary for his defense 3 9 The state's suppression of information outside the
defendant's practical investigatory capabilities 40 creates an investigatory resource imbalance between the prosecution and the accused.41This imbalance
gives rise to a defendant's due process interest under Brady.
lower courts. Thus, in United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3rd Cir. 1955),
the defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. His defense was
that he was too drunk to form the requisite intent to commit murder. The prosecutor suppressed evidence of a police officer's belief that Thompson was indeed drunk four hours after
the killing. The prosecutor had not acted in bad faith. Nevertheless, the court held the suppression of the arresting officer's testimony to be a denial of due process. The primary interest
at stake was not the possibility of fraud upon the criminal justice system, but rather the
disadvantage to the defendant. In subsequent cases such as United States v. Consolidated
Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961) and Application of Kapatos, 208 F. Supp. 883
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), the courts were also concerned more with the harm to the defendant in
instances of suppressed evidence than on the motive of the prosecutor in accomplishing such
suppression. Brady approved these developments in the suppression area in 1963.
34. 373 U.S. at 84. The petitioner was tried before his accomplice, Boblit. At this proceeding the petitioner admitted his participation in the crime but claimed that Boblit did the
actual killing. Petitioner's counsel asked in his summation to the jury only that the panel not
return a verdict of capital punishment. Id.
35. Id.
36. The prosecution did produce several of Boblit's statements to the petitioner's counsel;
however, the particular confession at issue was not produced. Id.
37. Brady v. Maryland, 226 Md. 422, 174 A.2d 167 (1962). The United States Supreme
Court accepted the unanimous Maryland Court of Appeals holding that nothing in the suppressed confession would have reduced the petitioner's offense below first degree murder. The
case was remanded inasmuch as the petitioner was prejudiced by the suppression of evidence
which may have swayed the jury to return a reduced penalty (life imprisonment, the statutory alternative). 373 U.S. at 85, 88-91.
38. 373 U.S. at 87.
39. See note 33 supra.
40. See note I supra.
41. See Datz, supra note 13, at 176-77. In rebutting the traditional arguments made against
development of a system of criminal discovery, Datz noted the cogent argument that in pretrial discovery there is no or limited mutuality and it would not be fair to the prosecution to
be forced to comply with a discovery system balanced against the state. Datz admitted the
truth of the issue: there usually is less mutuality in criminal discovery than the state desires.
However, the reality of the situation seemed to be that the state is actually the over-weight in
the scales of justice. Id. The state is the moving force in a criminal prosecution; it gathers its
evidence before the defense might even know a criminal proceeding is afoot; and law enforcement agencies are "far more effective in gathering their evidence" than the defendant. The
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The Brady decision left unclear both the scope of the prosecutorial duty to
disclose and the procedure for meeting that duty.42 Without defining that scope,
the Court in Giglio v. United States43 decided that different law enforcement
departments of the government must be viewed as a single entity for Brady
purposes. 4 4 In Giglio, a key government witness failed to testify truthfully at
trial concerning a promise of immunity in return for his testimony. Although
the trial prosecutor was unaware of the perjury, another member of the
prosecutorial team knew of it.4 The Court determined that if one member of
the prosecutorial team was aware of a state witness' perjury and failed to correct it, then the government as a whole had not fulfilled its Brady obligation. 48
Moore v. Illinois,47 decided the same term as Giglio, involved suppressed
evidence tending to impeach a government witness' identification of the petitioner as the person who allegedly killed a bartender. 48 The Court attempted
to define the scope of the disclosure duty by creating guidelines for a prosecutor or a court to consider in deciding whether information must be disclosed
or whether violations have occurred. The prosecutor or court must analyze: (I)
the information's favorable character, (2) the information's materiality, and (3)
whether the information was suppressed after a specific request for disclosure. 49
Despite its explication of Brady, however, the Moore Court failed to establish
a standard of materiality for disclosure of information sought by the defendant.

investigatory imbalance recognized by Datz appears to be the heart of the "fairness" issue in
due process challenges to suppression of evidence. Id. See note I supra.
42. The two major questions left unanswered by Brady concerned whether a specific request was a prerequisite to implementation of the duty to disclose and what evidence sought
by a defendant was important enough to be materially favorable. Other issues also remained,
such as timing of the disclosure and whether an implied duty to preserve evidence exists
under the Brady rationale. In Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967), the Court continued to
avoid the broad questions of whether the prosecution's constitutional duty to disclose extends
to all evidence admissible and useful to the defense and what degree of prejudice must be
shown for reversal or remand.
In Giles, both John and James Giles were convicted of rape and sentenced to death. John
claimed no intercourse occurred between him and the victim, whereas James alleged that the
victim "consented" to have intercourse with him. The girl's credibility was crucial due to the
facts of the case. Id. at 70. Because new evidence of prior inconsistent statements of the

prosecutrix with her trial testimony indicated perjury, the Court vacated on the basis of this
new information alone. Id. at 74-79.
In a concurring opinion in Giles, Justice Fortas stated that the Brady rule should be interpreted broadly in favor of disclosure. Thus, the request requirement was immaterial, and
inadmissibility of the evidence should not govern. According to Justice Fortas, a broad disclosure rule would offer a sanction to state suppression of evidence. Id. at 98-102 (Fortas, J.,
concurring).
43. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
44. Id. at 154.
45. Id. at 151-52.
46. Id. at 154-55. See State v. Coney, 294 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1974); Tatum & Marx, Twelfth
Survey of Florida Law: Part III-Criminal Law and Procedure, 30 U, MIAMI L. Rv. 635,
656-57 (1976).
47. 408 U.S. 786 (1972).

48. Id. at 789.
49. Id. at 794-95.
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It was not until United States v. Agurs5 ° that the Court defined a relatively
uniform materiality scheme to guide federal and state courts in dealing with
Brady-related issues. 51 The Agurs Court reiterated the Brady theme that a
prosecutor's constitutional duty of disclosure is not measured by his moral
culpability; rather, if suppression of the evidence results in constitutional error,
it is because of the "character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor."52 The Court then attempted to harmonize existing case law 53 by dividing suppression of evidence situations into three relatively distinct categories 54
with accompanying standards of materiality for review at trial or on appeal. 55
In the first category, exemplified by Mooney,58 "the undisclosed evidence
demonstrates that the prosecution's case includes perjured testimony and that
the prosecution knew, or should have known, of the perjury."57 The Court
established a strict standard of materiality for this category: a conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony or by the failure to correct
such testimony is fundamentally unfair and must be set aside if "there is any
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment
of the jury."58
The second category, illustrated by the Brady case, is typified by a specific
pretrial request for evidence. 59 Suppression of evidence favorable to the accused
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment. 60 The Court pointed out that implicit in Brady's materiality requirement
is a concern that "the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of
50. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
51. Before Agurs, the major problem that the lower courts faced was the determination
of whether evidence was sufficiently material to require a new trial when that evidence was
suppressed by the state. Some courts applied a harmless error standard and granted a new
trial if the evidence suppressed by the state would have affected the jury's verdict. See Levin
v. Katzenback, 363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Other lower federal courts used a reasonable
doubt test similar to that implemented by the Agurs Court. The requisite high showing of
materiality usually was interpreted to demand more than a slight possibility that a jury would
acquit the defendant with the evidence in contention. See generally Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d
80 (5th Cir. 1963); BERNSTEIN, 1A CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES §23.01[4] (1978).
52. 427 U.S. at 110.

53. See BERNSTEIN, supranote 51, §23.01[4].
54. See Supreme Court Review, Discovery -Prosecutor's Failure to Disclose, 67 J. CRIM.
L. & C. 408 (1976).
55. The Court noted that the question of materiality can arise in two contexts: first, in
advance of the trial or during the trial itself, where the prosecutor must make a decision to
disclose or a judge must determine whether to disclose information delivered to the court by
the prosecutor for in camera review; and second, after trial, when a judge must determine
whether the nondisclosure violated due process. 427 U.S. at 107-08. The Court stated that
"logically, the same standard must apply at both times." Id. at 108. The proper standard to be
applied in either case is whether the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that does
not otherwise exist.
56. See text accompanying notes 25-31 supra.
57. 427 U.S. at 103.
58. Id. This standard is similar to that used in United States v. Agurs, 510 F.2d 1249 (D.C.
Cir. 1975).
59. 427 U.S. at 104.
60. Id. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
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the trial."61 Because the defendant's specific request gives the prosecution

notice of what is required to meet the disclosure duty,62 "the failure to make
any response is seldom, if ever, excused.63 However, the Court did not state an
explicit standard of materiality for this second category.
The third category involves those situations in which the defendant made
a general request or no request for Brady material. 64 The Court noted that in
some cases exculpatory information in the prosecutor's possession may be unknown to the defense counsel who, as a consequence, does not request the
information. On the other hand, the defense counsel might ask for "anything
exculpatory" or "all Brady material."65 In such a case the prosecutor has a
constitutional duty to turn over exculpatory matter to the defense. The applicable standard of materiality requires disclosure if the evidence creates a
reasonable doubt of innocence or guilt that did not otherwise exist in the
judge's mind. 66 A reviewing court must examine the full record to determine
whether error has occurred as a result of nondisclosure in these situations.67
The factual situation in Agurs typified the third category of suppressed

evidence situations. 5 The petitioner sought a new trial after a second degree
murder conviction. The government had not informed petitioner of the victim's
criminal record, which allegedly would have demonstrated the victim's violent
character and supported petitioner's self-defense claim. 69 The Court found no
constitutional error in Agurs because the petitioner had not requested the
criminal record until the post-trial stage and because the trial court had remained convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the petitioner's guilt after
considering the omitted evidence in light of the entire record. 0

61. 427 US. at 104.

62. The concept of notice partially differentiates the second category from the third category situations in Agurs. Because the Court declined to analyze the conduct of the prosecutorial office, some other basis must be established to differentiate the categories when the
same item of evidence might be disclosable under the second category but not under the third
category. That differentiation is the notice the prosecutor receives through a specific Brady
request for information. Without such notice, or with only a general notice received from a
broadly-termed request for information, the prosecutor cannot be expected to Xummage
through his files for information the defendant seeks but cannot define. This rationale was
used by the Court in Agurs, 427 US. at 109, and in Moore v. Illinois, 408 US. 786, 795 (1972).
63. United States v. Agurs, 427 US. 97, 106 (1976).
64. See 427 U.S. at 109-11, where the Court discusses pre-Agurs authority that advocated
the abolition of the Brady specific request requirement.
65. Id. at 106. This is a typical use of the Brady doctrine and one which, in light of Agurs
will not liberally disclose evidence.
66. Id. at 112-13.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 114.
69. Id. at 98-102.
70. Id. at 114. A prosecutor, according to the Agurs decisions, does not violate the constitutional duty of disclosure unless the omission is "sufficiently significant" to result in the
denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. at 108-109. Because the Constitution does not
demand broad discovery, the mere possibility that an omitted item may have aided the
defense or might have affected the outcome of the trial does not establish materiality in the
constitutional sense. Id. at 109.
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In addition to creating materiality standards, 71 Agurs states that a prosecutor has a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to an accused absent a specific
Brady request or any request at all if the suppressed evidence would create a
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.72 The decision, however, failed
to analyze evidentiary considerations such as the admissibility or cumulative
nature of the evidence which may ultimately define the materiality of the
evidence. 73 Furthermore, the opinion did not answer such questions as when
the duty to disclose arises within the trial process,7 4 whether alternative discovery mechanisms must be exhausted prior to using Brady techniques, 7 5 or
whether a duty to preserve evidence for potential disclosure or discovery is
mandated by Brady.7 6 These issues threaten effective implementation and use
77
of the Brady doctrine and are treated in subsequent sections of this note.
DEVELOPMENT OF Ti-E

Brady DOCTRINE

IN FLORIDA

The FloridaSupreme Court
Development of the Brady doctrine in the Florida supreme court has been
limited in comparison with Brady activity in Florida's district courts of appeal.
71. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 51, §23.01[4]. For a view that Agurs is restrictive, presumably
in its classification scheme, see Kadish & Nafman, Handling the Multi-Defendant Criminal
Case, TRIAL, no. 4 at 35 (1978).
72. 427 U.S. at 112-13. The Agurs opinion included a vigorous dissent by Justice Marshall,
joined by Justice Brennan, which argued that the majority did not consider that category of
cases in which the prosecution might deliberately withhold evidence not meeting the reasonable doubt standard. This classification was noted in United States v. Morell, 524 F.2d 550
(2d Cir. 1975). Id. at 114-16. Furthermore, the standard of materiality for the third category
of cases under Agurs (that of reasonable doubt in the judge's mind) placed too great a
burden on the defendant and offered little incentive for the prosecution "to resolve close
questions of disclosure in favor of concealment." Id. at 117 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The
dissent would adopt a standard of materiality for the Agurs - like situation that would not
usurp "the function of the jury as the trier of fact in a criminal case." Id. Rather than rely
on a standard that focuses on the reasonable doubt in the judge's mind, the dissent would
favor one that concerned doubt in the minds of the jurors who should be the triers of the
evidence presented. The prosecutor's obligation to air all the relevant evidence might thus be
accomplished. Id. at 116-18. Commentators have noted that a failure to disclose in "close"
situations is invited by Agurs' sanctionless third category. See Adlerstein, Ethics, Federal
Prosecutors,and Federal Courts: Some Recent Problems, 6 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 755, 776-78 (1978).
73. See text accompanying notes 188-201 infra.
74. See text accompanying notes 162-174 infra.
75. See text accompanying notes 175-180 infra.
76. See text accompanying notes 202-217 infra.
77. If Agurs was decided in order to resolve existing case law difficulties in determining
what standard of materiality should apply to different nondisclosure situations, the issues left
after Agurs might require yet additional high court decisions to resolve the conflict among
jurisdictions. In some instances, that conflict exists within one jurisdiction because the Agurs
standards must be applied with a case-by-case analysis. The evidentiary determinations in a
single case alone will usually differ substantially from the next set of circumstances to make
complex the application of a fairly simple but undefined scheme such as Agurs. One major
criticism of the Agurs scheme, for example, is that the reasonable doubt standard will encourage the state to "take a gamble" and suppress information in hope that, if the suppression
is discovered, the prior conviction might still be upheld. See Comment, supra note 33, at
491-92.
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This distinction is particularly apparent in cases dealing with the Agurs classifications.
Anderson v. State78 in 1970 and State v. Crawford79 in 1972 illustrate the
Florida supreme court's acceptance of the Brady doctrine. 0 In both cases the
court noted that the denial of timely discovery of favorable evidence otherwise
unavailable to the accused may affect the fundamental fairness of the trial
process. 81 Anderson involved a pretrial request by the defendant for the polygraph test results of codefendants testifying against him.82 Crawford was concerned with a similar request for criminal or FBI records of all potential state
witnesses.8 3 In both cases, the court denied the pretrial requests because the
evidence sought was inadmissible at trial."' The court noted in both cases that
the prosecutor's duty to disclose existed under Brady if the requested information was admissible and useful to the defendant, insofar as it was "probably
material and exculpatory."8 5
Despite the court's explicit recognition of Brady in both Anderson and
Crawford, the latter opinion also noted that the prosecuting attorney "should
not be required to actively assist defendant's attorney in the investigation of
the case."8 10 The Crawford court thus demonstrated what one commentator has
8
termed the traditional, restrictive view of pretrial criminal discovery. 7
Soon after the Crawford decision, the Florida supreme court adopted rule
3.220 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,88 thus signaling a changing
attitude toward pretrial criminal discovery8 9 State v. Coney90 reflected this new
receptiveness. The court in Coney held that upon a defendant's pretrial motion,
discovery of criminal records of state witnesses was mandated by rule 3.22091
to the extent that such information was in the actual or constructive possession
of the prosecutorial office.9 2
78. 241 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1970).
79. 257 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1972).
80. Anderson and Crawford are among the earliest Florida supreme court decisions interpreting the Brady doctrine in Florida.
81. 257 So. 2d at 899-900; 241 So. 2d at 394.
82. 241 So. 2d at 394-95.
83. 257 So. 2d at 899.
84. 257 So. 2d at 901; 241 So. 2d at 395.
85. 257 So. 2d at 900; 241 So. 2d at 395. This test is derived from the Maryland court in
State v. Giles, 239 Md. 458, 212 A.2d 101 (1965) and quoted with approval by Mr. Justice
Brennan in Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
86. State v. Crawford, 257 So. 2d at 900. The court continued: "Discovery in criminal
cases has tended to be heavily weighted in favor of the defendant, and it would be contrary
to the general principle of advocacy, as well as fairness itself, to require the prosecuting attorney to perform any duties on behalf of the defendant in the prepartion of the case." Id.
87. Comment, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure-Investigative Reports Neither
Signed by Nor Directly Quoting a Declarant Are Not Discoverable "Statements" Within Rule
3.220, 2 FiA. ST. U. L. Rxv. 657, 668-69 (1974).
88. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1973).
89. See Comment, supra note 87, at 665-71. See e.g., Mahone v. State, 222 So. 2d 769 (Fla.
2d D.C.A. 1969).
90. 294 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1974).
91. The court referred specifically to FLA. R. CRm. P. 3.220(d) (1972).
92. 294 So. 2d at 87. The court felt that if the information sought by the defendant was
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Coney is particularly significant insofar as the court recognized that the
fundamental requirement of fairness which forms the basis of the Brady doctrine93 is the same basic policy underlying rule 3.220. 94 The court went so far
as to state that inasmuch as criminal pretrial discovery was oriented toward
fairness,95 the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure were more effective in
attaining that goal than their counterpart in the federal system. 96
A week after Coney,97 the Florida supreme court found the Brady doctrine
inapplicable in a case where the defendant made no specific pretrial request for
the information. In Resnick v. State,98 the defendant claimed suppression by
the state of an alleged co-conspirator's prior inconsistent statement which supposedly exculpated the accused. 99 The court held that the defendant was not
entitled to a new trial when he did not show a deliberate suppression of evidence and when that evidence related only to a witness' already questionable
credibility.100 Resnick's emphasis on a specific request for information illustrated the difficulty of claiming a Brady suppression violation in Florida
unless such a request had been made. 1 1
In a scathing dissent,02 Judge Grossman' 0s asserted that the information
favorable to the defendant in Resnick had been deliberately suppressed and
that the defense, unaware of that information until trial, had adequately
sought discovery.104 Grossman urged recognition of a prosecutorial duty of
otherwise available to him, his discovery motion for the criminal records of all state witnesses
which are in the possession of the state must be denied. Criminal records of potential state
witnesses are in actual or constructive possession of the state for discovery only if they are in
physical possession of any state prosecutorial or law enforcement office. If the fingerprints of
the witness are in possession of the state, the records sought are available through computer
systems. Notably, the court determined that the state was able to obtain fingerprints of a
witness only by his own voluntary cooperation. Id. See notes 43-46 supra and accompanying

text.
93. See note I supra.
94. 294 So. 2d at 87.
95. Id.
96. Id. That counterpart is FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
97. Coney was decided Oct. 31, 1973; the Resnick decision was issued Nov. 7, 1963.
98. 287 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1973).
99. Id. at 26.
100. Id. at 28.
101. The court stated: "It is also error to suppress evidence where a motion to disclose is
made by the defendant irrespective of the good faith or the bad faith of the State. Id. (citing
Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). In this case, however, no request to disclose
this statement was made by the defendant."
102. Id. at 29-37 (Grossman, J., dissenting).
103. Chief Justice Carlton and Justice Ervin concurred in the dissent.
104. 287 So. 2d at 30-32 (Grossman, J., dissenting). These threshold issues were convincingly dispatched upon a thorough analysis of the record. As Judge Grossman noted, "the suppression is obvious;" furthermore, "it would border on incredulity to contend that the suppression was not 'deliberate'." Id. at 31. The suppressed evidence would have reflected directly
on the credibility of the chief state witnesses. Id. at 30. As soon as the defendant was aware of
the prior statement, he filed a motion to disclose. Id. at 32. Thus, Brady's disclosure duty was
applicable. The dissent noted an extensive collection of cases demonstrating the kinds of suppressed evidence that courts have felt were useful enough to the defense to warrant a new
trial. Id. at 33 n.l.
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voluntary disclosure of evidence based on a conjunctive reading of Brady, discovery provisions in the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Canon 5 of
the ABA Code of Professional Ethics. 105 It was not until Agurs that such a duty
of voluntary disclosure, absent a request, was held applicable in suppression
cases.
The Florida supreme court's first explicit recognition of the Agurs decision
was in 1978 in Antone v. State.1 6 The prosecuting attorney in that first degree
murder case supplemented the record subsequent to appeal with newly-acquired
information that the Florida Department of Law Enforcement107 had paid fees
to the attorneys of a codefendant who subsequently negotiated a plea and
became the state's principal witness. 108 The petitioner asserted that failure to
reveal this information in pretrial discovery violated both Brady and the continuing duty to disclose requirements of rule 3.220(f).109 Petitioner alleged

further that a different verdict might have resulted with timely disclosure because the information was relevant to the credibility of a key state witness and
was "materially favorable" to the defense. 1 0 The court responded that a Brady
violation may have occurred and remanded for an evidentiary hearing using
the Agurs materiality standards.""
Notably, the Antone court remanded on the basis of conflict with Agurs
only; it did not consider the asserted rule 3.220(f) violation. That rule re105. Judge Grossman contended that the defendant bad made the "usual" discovery motions under the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and could not be expected to be more
specific in his request. The dissent's suggestion was that, in the absence of a specific Brady
motion for disclosure, pretrial motions for discovery under the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure would suffice to meet the Brady requirement. The defendant had sought discovery
under FLA. R. C~iM. P. 8.220(a), which outlines the duty of the prosecutor at trial. 287 So. 2d
at 32.
The dissent also argued that FLA. R. Clum. P. M220(a)(2), requiring a prosecutor to "disdose any material information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused" had been
violated. In Judge Grossman's view the new provision imposed a voluntary prosecutorial duty
to disclose in addition to the Brady requirement, insofar as it did not require a defense request. 287 So. 2d at 32.
Finally, the dissent suggested that ABA CANONS OF PROF--SIONAL ETHics No. 5, which states
that the prosecutorial function is "not to convict, but to see that justice is done," required
voluntary disclosure. This contention is grounded in the concept of "fairness" which underlies
the prosecutorial duty to avoid "tipping the scales against the Defendant" in a truth-seeking
context already burdened by the investigatory imbalance between the state and the defendant. Id. at 32.
106. 855 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1978).
107. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement was as much a part of Florida's executive branch as the different prosecutorial offices within the executive branch of the United
States government for purposes of a Brady violation. 855 So. 2d at 777. See also Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
108. 855 So. 2d at 777-78.

109. FLA. R. Ca m. P. 3.220() provides: "If, subsequent to compliance with the rules, a
party discovers additional witnesses or material which he would have been under a duty to
disclose or produce at the time of such previous compliance, he shall promptly disclose or
produce such witnesses or material in the same manner as required under these rules for initial
discovery."
110. 855 So. 2d at 778.
111. Id.
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quires that the prosecutor disclose or produce additional witnesses or material
should the state discover such new evidence subsequent to compliance with
other provisions of rule 3.220.112 However, the court's failure to discuss rule
3.220(f) does not necessarily detract from the petitioner's discovery strategy of
using both a procedural and constitutional attack upon the state's suppression
of evidence. If the Brady doctrine had failed, the court might still have employed rule 3.220(f) to the petitioner's benefit. 13
In a subsequent case, State v. Sobel,11 petitioner filed a pretrial motion to
dismiss on the grounds that the state's destruction of a tape recording allegedly crucial to his defense violated his due process rights. The destroyed
tape was of the drug transaction out of which the petitioner's convictions arose
and in which the petitioner denied participation. "1 5 Citing Brady and Agurs,
the court held that the petitioner was not denied due process where the contents of the lost or destroyed tape would not have been beneficial to him. 1 8
The court balanced the unintelligibility of the tape and other evidence adduced at trial against the state's negligent destruction.11 Because the evidence
was destroyed due to inaudibility and in apparent good faith, the court decided
that the state had met its burden of proving no prejudice from the destruction
of the evidence.118
The District Courts of Appeal
While a number of district court cases have dealt with Brady issues, recent
decisions incorporating Agurs best demonstrate the trend in Florida case law.
Several of the district courts of appeal have issued opinions that specifically
incorporate the Agurs standards of materiality." 9
The Third District Court of Appeal alone has established an identifiable

112. See note 109 supra.
113. The court probably failed to address the FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(f) issue because the
state did supplement the record. Petitioner's argument was that under Giglio the information
should have been disclosed earlier by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. See note
107 supra. The court did address the fundamental issue of suppression; however, its Agurs
approach incorporated the Giglio aspect.
114. 363 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1978).
115. Id. at 325.
116. Id.at 328. The dilemma posed in applying Agurs to a destruction of evidence situation is that an appropriate standard of materiality is difficult to fix on evidence which no
longer exists.
117. The court relied on United States v. Bryant, 448 F.2d 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1971) in its
adoption of the "balance" test for destruction of evidence cases. See generally Comment,
Judicial Response to Governmental Loss or Destruction of Evidence, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 542
(1972). For examples of destruction of evidence treatment in other opinions, see United States
v. Quiovers, 539 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1976); State v. Smith, 342 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1977).
118. The state has the burden of demonstrating lack of prejudice in destruction cases as
opposed to the defendant's usual assumption of the initial burden of demonstrating a proper
predicate for disclosure. See note 203 infra.
119. See notes 120 & 13 infra.
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series of Agurs cases." 0 In Briskin v. State, 21 the petitioner sought exculpatory
police files but made no specific request for the information. The trial court
briefly examined the files and determined that they were not material to the
case.12 2 On appeal, the state argued that the Brady standards enunciated in
Moore v. Illinois did not require disclosure.12s The Third District Court of

Appeal disagreed and thoroughly inspected the entire record to determine the
materiality of the evidence sought,124 using Agurs' "reasonable doubt" standard

as the ultimate test of disclosure.12s Because Briskin involved suppression of
evidence material to the defendant's case under Agurs, the failure to disclose
was held to be reversible error. 28
The Third District Court of Appeal again confronted a disclosure issue
involving police records in Cravero v. State.'2 After conviction, petitioner
sought eyewitness testimony in police reports which had not been voluntarily
disclosed. The court held that the information sought was not of such obvious

exculpatory value as to require post-conviction relief. 28 The court noted that
the information sought could easily have been gained by defense counsel upon
a rudimentary questioning of police officers. While the failure to exhaust al120. The Third District Court of Appeal cases exemplify the usefulness of consistently
employing the Agurs classification scheme to a series of cases rather than on an ad hoc basis.
See text accompanying notes 248-249 infra.
121. 341 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 953 (1977).
122. 341 So. 2d at 782.
123. Id.; see text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
124. The court relied on the Agurs requirement of review of the "entire record" for its
determination that the trial court's cursory examination in a disclosure hearing was erroneous.
125. 341 So. 2d at 782-83.
126. Id. The court was confronted with a prosecution in which the accused was convicted
of possession of a stolen motor vehicle and five counts of temporary and unauthorized use of a
vehicle. AU of the crimes required some degree of knowledge or intent. The court determined
that the fact that a warrant had been issued for another person's arrest on similar charges
should have been sufficient to allow discovery of the police file on the third person in light
of the defendant's disclaimer of knowledge. The evidence was of such substantial value to the
defense that elementary fairness required disclosure, even absent a specific request. Id. at 782.
In Smith v. State, 364 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1978), the court refused to reverse the
appellant's conviction of grand larceny on the basis that the state had in its possession material which might have created a reasonable doubt of the appellant's guilt. The court explicitly applied "the limitation upon Brady imposed by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Agurs... [that] a conviction will not be reversed for violation of the Brady
rule unless the omission is of sufficient importance to result in a denial of defendant's right to
a fair trial." Id. at 876. The district court did not explicitly define the factual setting of the
state's suppression in Smith. The court did note, however, that the record demonstrated the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and stated that the omission would have had
"no meaningful effect" on the trial outcome. Id. at 877.
127. 349 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1977), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 129 (1978). The defendant sought "new" eyewitness testimony in an arresting officer's report.
Cravero involved eyewitness testimony of a person other than the arresting officer. If the
police officers themselves witnessed or were the victims of the incident and filed written and
signed reports, such police reports are considered "statements" subject to discovery under FLA.
R. CRsm. P. 3.220(a)(1)(ii). See State v. Dumas, 363 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1978); Miller v.
State 360 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1978).
128. 349 So. 2d at 651.
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ternative discovery routes was not determinative, it weighed heavily against
disclosure where the information sought was of questionable exculpatory
value. 129
Hernandez v. State130 applied Agurs' second standard of materiality to
specifically requested information tending to impeach a government witness.
The court held that error was committed when the trial court refused to permit inspection of a state witness' statement for use as defense counsel might see
fit. 13 1 It was not necessary that the statement be exculpatory to allow inspection, as long as inconsistencies between the statement and the witness' trial
2
testimony could be used to impeach on material issues."3
Only one reported decision of the Second District Court of Appeal has expressly used the Agurs standards to resolve the Brady issue."3 The court's 1969
decision in State v. Gillespie,.3 however, is often cited as authority in Florida
nondisclosure decisions." 5 The case discusses the extent to which the prosecution may be compelled to cooperate in the pretrial discovery efforts of a defendant and suggests that while there is no constitutional right to pretrial dis7
covery, 3 6r Brady requires timely disclosure of favorable evidence."3
In Gillespie, the respondent moved generally for all evidence which might
be favorable to the defense, regardless of whether it was admissible at trial.138
Respondent enumerated eleven nonspecific items of evidence, including grand
jury testimony."s 9 The trial court ordered pretrial in camera inspection of all
129. Id. This emphasis upon "exhaustion" of alternative discovery routes is a traditional
doctrine in Florida criminal discovery case law. See text accompanying notes 175-180 infra.
130. 348 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1977), cert. denied, 355 So. 2d 517 (1978).
131. 348 So. 2d at 1225.
132. Id.
133. Mitchell v. State, 358 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1978). This destruction of evidence
decision used the Agurs "reasonable doubt" standard to find that, in a situation in which the
suppressed evidence was in fact destroyed, a reviewing court must focus upon the facts of the
entire record. Under the Mitchell facts, a witness testified that the destroyed evidence, a tape
recording of the alleged criminal transaction, was or could be made intelligible. The defendant
sought the tape in order to corroborate his denial of the charges against him. On appeal, the
court vacated the trial court's judgment, insofar as the witness' testimony and the fact that
the evidence was destroyed raised a reasonable doubt that the evidence might have exculpated
the defendant. The Second District Court of Appeal noted that the trial court "must make an
evidentiary determination as to whether the evidence withheld by the state is material to the
defendant's guilt or punishment." Id. at 240.
The Mitchell decision followed upon the same court's dictum in another destruction of
evidence case, State v. Smith, 342 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977), which ruled that dismissal of charges against a defendant is an extreme sanction which must be exercised with
caution.
134. 227 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969).
135. Wills & Caruana, CriminalLaw and Procedure,26 U. MIAMI L. REv. 289, 378 (1972).
See also Anderson v. State, 241 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1970); State v. Williams, 227 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1970); State v. Drayton, 226 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969).
136. 227 So. 2d at 553. This contention is echoed by other district courts of appeal.
See, e.g., State v. Crews, 241 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1970).
137. 227 So. 2d at 557-61; State v. Drayton, 226 So. 2d 469, 471-75 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969).
138. 227 So. 2d at 552.
139. Id.
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requested information. The Second District Court of Appeal held that the
trial court's order, based on a "mere naked demand" for disclosure without
any predicate establishing the necessity of such disclosure or the constitutional
invalidity of withholding the information, was a material departure from existing legal principles and could not be upheld.140
According to Gillespie, therefore, a defendant must show that the evidence
sought is materially "favorable" to establish the necessary predicate for pretrial disclosure.141 The Gillespie court defined favorable evidence as that "which
a reasonably skilled prosecutor should know could be fairly and probably used
to advantage by the accused on issues of guilt or punishment. '14 2 The defendant must also demonstrate that pretrial production of the evidence would
expedite the administration of justice and would satisfy fair trial requirements. 43 Thus, where statutory1 44 or constitutional' 45 provisions require disclosure of information during trial or at post-trial proceedings, pretrial disclosure may be warranted in the interests of judicial expediency.148
Once the defendant establishes an adequate predicate for pretrial Brady
disclosure, Gillespie provides a discretionary in camera hearing to determine
whether the state must comply with the defendant's request.1 47 At any point
140. Id. at 560. The court stated that Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1105 (1969), relied upon by the trial court in its in camera order, did
not mandate such a proceeding. State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d at 560. Dutton was cast in a
post-trial setting.
141. The favorability requirement arises out of Brady's requirements. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
142. 227 So. 2d at 556. The Gillespie court thus determined that "favorable" evidence is
broader than "exculpatory" evidence. Because of the breadth of this standard and recognition
of the adversary nature of the trial system, the court concluded that the "critical determination" to disclose belongs initially to the petitioner. That right is subject to the corresponding
duties of the state under Brady and Canon 5. Id. Effective disclosure, the court noted, depends
to a great extent upon the integrity of the prosecutorial office. In many cases the defendant
and the court will not know of favorable evidence and must presume the good faith of the

prosecutor.
The prosecutor's acts must be "entitled to a presumption of regularity and propriety." Id.
at 555. In cases in which defense counsel is aware, by inference or direct knowledge, of the
existence of exculpatory information in the state's possession, reliance on the state's honesty is
lowered, although the defense must still lay an adequate predicate for disclosure. Id. at 553-61;
see text accompanying note 140 supra.
143. 227 So. 2d at 558-59.
144. Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. §3500 (1970): "(a): In any criminal prosecution brought by the
United States, no statement or report in the possession of the United States which was made
by a Government witness . . .shall be the subject of subpena [sic]), discovery, or inspection

until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case. (b) After a
witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on
motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any statement.., of the witness
in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the
witness has testified...."
145. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
146. This determination of expediency and disclosure pursuant to such is left to the discretion of the trial judge, whose ultimate duty is to conduct a fair and expeditious trial. State
v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d at 559.
147. 227 So. 2d at 556-57. See note 140 supra. The Gillespie court was cognizant of the fact
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the state can avoid this process, of course, by voluntarily disclosing the information. If the defendant does not know what information exists, however,
an in camera examination might provide the necessary vehicle for adequate
148
pretrial disclosure by the state.'
USING TIiE Brady DOCTRINE IN FLORIDA: PosT-Agurs PROBLEMS

Effective use of the Brady doctrine in Florida by defense counsel, prosecutorial offices and the courts requires an understanding of the problems of
Brady practice left unanswered by Agurs. Those problem areas include the
150
the necessity of exhausting
necessity of a request, 49 timing of disclosure,
151
standards,' 5 2 and
materiality
Agurs
of
scope
the
sources,
other information
"materiality factors" or evidentiary considerations surrounding the disclosure
duty. 153 Application of the Brady doctrine to destruction of evidence situations
4
remains an unresolved but fertile area of Brady practice.' Finally, the Florida
practitioner must understand the interrelationship between the Brady doctrine
5
and rule 3.220 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure5 for effective use
of the constitutional disclosure duty in the post-Agurs period.
The Necessity of a Request
The United States Supreme Court determined in Agurs that a low standard
of materiality applies on appeal when a prosecutor receives a specific request
for evidence and fails to respond. 56 On the other hand, if the defense makes no
request or only a general request for favorable evidence, the stricter "reasonable
157
The main difference between these
doubt" standard of materiality applies.

that in camera examination of evidence must be exercised with judicial restraint because of
the "ponderous, time-consuming" potential of the use of such hearing in every evidentiary
disclosure decision. See also State v. Crews, 241 So. 2d 754 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1970); McGarr,
Anatomy of a Criminal Case in a Federal Court, 75 F.R.D. 269, 274 (1975): "Brady v. Maryland requires the government, and very frequently a request and an order will supplement
that requirement, to produce anything they have favorable to the defendant, exculpatory in
nature. Who's going to decide that? The answer that is obvious is also a trap. The answer is in
camera inspection, but that's the trap. You can spend all of your days going through government files trying to decide what in there is favorable to the defendant under Brady v. Maryland, or what in there is material to the preparation of the defense, thus entitling the defendant to it under Rule 16, and we'd all be bogged down hopelessly if we did." Id.
148. State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d at 557-59. While Gillespie and other Second District
Court of Appeal decisions developing a pretrial Brady disclosure mechanism indicated that a
request was necessary to invoke the Brady doctrine, Agurs subsequently provided that disclosure may be required absent a request. 427 U.S. at 110-11. Thus, the state can use a pretrial
in camera hearing as a device to meet that duty under Agurs.
149. See text accompanying notes 156-161 infra.
150. See text accompanying notes 162-174 infra.
151. See text accompanying notes 175-180 infra.
152. See text accompanying notes 181-187 infra.
153. See text accompanying notes 188-201 infra.
154. See text accompanying notes 202-217 infra.
155. See text accompanying notes 218-227 infra.
156. See text accompanying notes 59-63 supra.
157. See text accompanying notes 64-67 supra.
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two situations is the specificity of the request. The defendant should make a
request for information as specific as possible.151 Furthermore, specific demand
helps the trial court or reviewing court to avoid rummaging through piles of
evidence to determine if disclosure is required or whether nondisclosure has
violated due process. 159 In some instances, however, deliberate suppression of
evidence by a prosecutor abrogates the need for a specific request,160 and "obviously exculpatory" evidence is subject to disclosure without a request by the
defendant. Practically, such evidence may never come to light. If it did, however, a conviction might easily be turned into an embarrassing reversal for the
state.101

Timing
The issue of when a prosecutor should disclose Brady material has not been

directly addressed by the United States Supreme Court. While the Mooney line
of perjury cases indicates that the prosecutor must disclose truthful evidence
and must correct perjured evidence at trial, -no Supreme Court cases have decided whether disclosure is required in the pretrial period.16 2 On the other
hand, several Florida courts have held that Brady does not require pretrial

158. See text accompanying notes 228-43 infra. The United States Supreme Court has
acknowledged that the specificity of the request will determine which Agurs standard of materiality will be applicable. See text accompanying notes 53-67 supra. Furthermore, the more
specific the request, the greater the notice given the prosecutor of what information is sought.
Such notification will facilitate disclosure if the information sought is not of such character as
to be guarded by the state or necessarily disclosed without notice.
The specific request can be of some harm. If a defendant carelessly requests only those
items of specific information which might be in the possession of the state and which form
the core of the defendant's trial defense, then the accused has prejudiced himself by disclosing
the trial strategy to be employed. This situation need not arise, however, if the defense
counsel phrases the Brady demands to force disclosure of the exact information sought without admitting what defense will be asserted. Proper wording of the Brady request might be
accompanied by a demand for other information which is arguably material and favorable but
which is unlikely to be asserted in the defense at trial. Such determinations will vary from case
to case as the defense counsel is confronted with varying fact situations that may change
within a particular case daily. See Comment, Materiality and' Defense Requests: Aids in Defining the Prosecutor'sDuty of Disclosure, 59 IowA L. Rav. 433 (1973).
159. See Liles & Patterson, ProsecutorialDisclosure: In Camera and Beyond, 22 U. FLA. L.
R v. 491, 505 (1970).
160. See Comment, supra note 158, at 451. The dissenting opinion in Resnick viewed

prosecutorial misconduct alone as a sufficient basis for reversal of a conviction in a suppression
situation. Resnick v. State, 287 So. 2d 24, 29-37 (Fla. 1973).
161. See Briskin v. State, 341 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 953
(1977).
162. See Comment, supra note 31, at 117-21, in which the argument is made that pretrial
disclosure of information to the defense allows that party to work with the evidence in preparation for trial. The evidence disclosed might ultimately be rejected by the defense. However, the disclosed information, released at a sufficiently early time to allow its exploitation by
counsel, should not necessarily be rejected because "any" information is susceptible to favoring
the defense without necessarily being material,
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disclosure.163 In State v. Drayton,8 4 for example, the Second District Court of
Appeal stated that Brady was not another pretrial discovery vehide. 16
Nevertheless, while neither the United States Supreme Court nor the
Supreme Court of Florida have explicitly stated that a constitutional right to
pretrial discovery of favorable evidence exists, some courts in Florida and elsewhere have recommended pretrial disclosure to enable a defendant to investigate and develop favorable evidence 6 In State v. Crews,'"7 for example, the
First District Court of Appeal stated that it was in the interests of the defendant's right to a fair trial and the expeditious handling of cases to require
pretrial disclosure when favorable evidence requested under both criminal
procedure discovery provisions and the Brady doctrine would ultimately be
available to the defendant at trial.188 The court remarked that, to insure a fair
trial, "enlightened criminal jurisprudence"'1 9 would allow disclosure at a point
at which the defendant can use it in preparing for trial. A similar rationale
for pretrial disclosure was adopted by the Second District Court of Appeal in
the Gillespie case. 7 0 Under Florida case law, however, failure of the prosecutor
to disclose favorable evidence at an early stage is not reversible error unless the
accused can demonstrate prejudice.173

In Antone v. State" 2 the Florida supreme court indicated that the failure to
disclose evidence before or at trial may be a Brady violation, insofar as the state
has a duty to produce favorable or impeaching evidence at the "appropriate
time."' 73 Upon demonstration that suppression of favorable or impeachment
evidence during the pretrial period has prejudiced defendant's preparation for
trial or effective use of the information sought, relief might be available in
the form of an order to disclose, the granting of a new trial, or a motion to
dismiss.

7

Exhaustion of Alternative Information Sources
Florida courts have traditionally required exhaustion of alternative information sources prior to a Brady request. The Second District Court of Appeal in
163. See cases cited in Comment, supra note 31, at 117 nn.24 &25.
164. 226 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969).
165. See text accompanying notes 167-170 infra.
166. See note 162 supra.
167. 241 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1970).
168. Id. The First District Court of Appeal decision adopted the rationale of Circuit Judge
John J. Crews.
169. 241 So. 2d at 755. Notably, the Florida Highway Patrol traffic homicide investigatory
report sought by the defendant in Crews was not otherwise available except upon discovery,
and the report's information was necessary to the defense preparation. The report would have
been available to the defendant upon the state's use of the report at trial. Id.
170. See text accompanying note 142 supra.
171. Prejudice to the defendant from suppression by the state approximates the elements
of the predicate which must be established for pretrial disclosure in Gillespie. See text accompanying notes 141-146 supra.
172. 355 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1978).
173. Id. at 778. The court's reiteration of the Dutton standard demonstrates the continuing vitality of Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir. 1968). See note 140 supra.
174. Id.
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Williams v. State1 75 noted that Brady material was not available during pretrial proceedings unless "the evidence cannot be obtained through utilization
of appropriate portions of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure or applicable statutes."'' 7
The requirement that the defendant exhaust alternative discovery methods
maintains the "adversary" environment in criminal proceedings y7r The courts
have found that a prosecutor should not be required to comb his files for pieces
of evidence which might be useful to the defense.' 78 Specific pretrial discovery
requests under the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure should obviate most
9
disclosure problems.'7
Unanswered, however, is whether the Brady doctrine requires disclosure or
post-trial relief when the defendant fails to seek exculpatory material under
the procedural discovery rules and otherwise does not request production of
the information. If the information is so useful to the defendant that the state
should have disclosed it without request, due process considerations would
appear to override the exhaustion requirement. The essence of Agurs is that
some evidence is so important to the truth-finding process that even the defense
counsel's negligence cannot vitiate due process disclosure. Although exhaustion
of criminal discovery rules and other discovery alternatives is appropriate,
failure to seek alternative discovery may not totally undermine a defendant's
due process right to prosecutorial disclosure.180
Standardsof Materiality
The guidelines enunciated in Agurs have proven far from self-implementing. The standards of materiality defined by the Supreme Court and the three
disclosure categories to which the standards apply overlap and require case-bycase adjudication by trial courts and the appellate judiciary.
In particular, the first category of the Agurs classification scheme involves
perjured testimony. An issue arises as to whether the standards of that category,
with its low materiality threshold, are applicable when a prosecutor does not
disclose prior inconsistent statements which could arguably impeach a state
witness who does not actually assert perjurious statements at trial.'s8 The lower
175. 227 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 237 So. 2d 180 (1970).
176. 227 So. 2d at 257. According to the Williams court, the proof of exhaustion is part of
the necessary predicate prior to a pretrial order necessitating pretrial disclosure of evidence.
Id. at 256.
177. State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d at 553.
178. Id. at 556.
179. Id. at 560. Under FLA. R. QlUM. P. 3.220(a), a criminal defendant is offered a wide
range of discovery information through written demand during a specific time provision.
Furthermore, the rule provides for discovery absent written demand. See text accompanying
notes 222-224 infra. The defendant can first seek to obtain information through use of rule
3.220. Brady requests and motions should be filed concurrently and subsequently, if necessary.
180. In a case in which the exculpatory nature of the information sought is not obvious,
the added factor of failure to seek alternative remedies might persuade a court to decide
against disclosure.
181. The line between impeaching evidence and evidence which proves perjury may be
very ill-defined. See United States v. Hearst, 424 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d
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federal courts' 82 have generally treated the evidence as category three (potentially favorable) information, which must create a reasonable doubt in the
minds of jurors as to the guilt or innocence of the accused in order to benefit
the defendant. The rationale for this classification is that the Mooney perjury
cases, which exemplify Agurs' first category, require intentional and knowing
use of perjured testimony. The mere fact that the prosecutor possesses testimony which could impeach a state witness is not adequate to fulfill that re83
quirement1
The distinction between suppression of impeachment evidence and perjury
is vague. Furthermore, because the former is usually not susceptible to a duty
to disclose, defense counsel must seek out prior inconsistent statements at trial.
This situation was addressed in Hernandez v. State,8 4 a district court case in
which the state failed to voluntarily disclose prior inconsistent statements of a
principal state witness during the pretrial period. At trial, defense counsel
elicited from the witness the fact that a prior statement had been made and
sought to compel production of the statement on the ground that it contained
inconsistencies with the witness' trial testimony. The defense argued that the
state had violated Brady by its knowing failure to correct the untruthful testimony and its suppression of evidence that might impeach the credibility of the
witness. 8 5- The court held that the defense was entitled to the material for
impeachment purposes under Brady.186 The court noted, furthermore, that
"[it was not necessary that the statement show exculpatory material to entitle
the defense to it; it went to impeachment on material issues, which entitled the
1331 (9th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Sanfilippo, 564 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1977); Garrison
v. Maggio, 540 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1976) (prior inconsistent statements knowingly withheld
from disclosure did not qualify under the court's test as first category perjured testimony but
rather as third category favorable evidence to be analyzed under the "reasonable basis"
standard of materiality upon nondisclosure).
182. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 51, §23.01[4]; United States v. Sutton, 542 F.2d 1239 (4th
Cir. 1976). Sutton distinguished cases in which the state allows false testimony on matters
directly related to the credibility of a witness and those decisions which involve possession by
the state of potential impeachment evidence which does not involve "prosecutorial misconduct
or corruption of the truth-finding process." Id. at 1241-42. The court found the "Agurs"
(reasonable doubt) standard applicable in the latter type of cases and the "Giglio" (or
perjury) standard applicable in the former.

183.

See

BERNSTEIN,

supra note 51, §23.01[4].

184. 348 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A.), cert. denied, 355 So. 2d 517 (1978). See also Goldberg v. State, 351 So. 2d 332 (Fla. 1977). In Goldberg, the court found error in the state's
failure to disclose to the defendants, who requested disclosure of all crimes, prior inconsistent
statements and the immunity terms of a state witness in a related case in which that witness
had testified falsely. The court considered that the state's knowing failure to disclose violated
Brady insofar as the details suppressed were essential to preparing a case in which credibility
was determinative of the entire issue. The Goldberg court apparently considered that a
specific pretrial request was made. The facts of Goldberg were within the Brady category of
the Agurs classification scheme rather than the "perjury" category. The distinction is important insofar as a knowing use by the state of perjurious statements is never condoned. The
court in Goldberg failed to focus on this factor. If it had, it might have found that the
"suppression" issue was unimportant insofar as the statement went to impeachment value on
the material issue of credibility. See note 182 supra.
185. 348 So. 2d at 1224-25.
186. Id.
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defense to it."'18 7 Thus, the Third District Court of Appeal has established a
potential "category one" standard applicable to cases involving the state's suppression of prior inconsistent statements which go to impeachment.
Meaning of Materiality
Although Agurs defined the basic standards of materiality, questions as to
what constitutes "materiality" continue to arise. Lower courts have dealt with
89
aspects of the
these issues by analyzing the favorability 188 and admissibility
190
suppressed evidence.
"Favorable" evidence has been liberally defined by the Florida courts; it
9
includes more than the term "exculpatory" evidence.' ' Favorable evidence is
that which a reasonably skilled prosecutor should know could be used by de92
fense counsel on the issues of guilt or punishment. If a defendant can demonstrate that the evidence sought supports his case, then it should be disclosed. 93
94
Impeachment evidence may be difficult to categorize. In State v. Johnson,
the defendant, accused of breaking and entering with intent to commit grand
larceny, sought police reports for the purpose of impeaching the arresting
officer. The issue of guilt revolved around the identification of a white substance on the defendant's jacket; the officer testified at trial that he observed
9
this white substance on the jacket at the time of arrest. 5 Defense counsel
sought to impeach this testimony by demonstrating that the arrest report failed
to mention a white substance. The court determined that the defendant was
not entitled to the police reports, statements, or documents unless the evidence was critical, dealt with a vital issue, and was reasonably exculpatory. A
187. Id. at 1225 n.2. Notably, the court cited Giglio as supporting authority. Giglio was
a "class one" case. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra. The court determined that the
trial judge should have permitted the defense counsel to see prior inconsistent statements of
a state witness which the state had suppressed. The defense counsel should also have been able
to use the statements "as he might see fit in conducting the defendant's defense." 348 So. 2d at
1224. Hernandez is similar to Goldberg except that a pretrial Brady request was made in the
latter case while Hernandez involved a Brady request made at trial.
The Agurs classification scheme also creates a distinction between the use of a specific or a
general request for favorable material. The simplicity of the classification belies the difficulty
of determining how specific a defense request must be to fall within the second category of
Agurs. See text accompanying notes 156-161 supra. See also Resnick v. State, 287 So. 2d 24, 32
(Fla. 1973) (Grossman, J., dissenting), in which Circuit Judge Grossman criticizes the majority's need for a specific pretrial request from a defendant who was unaware until trial of
the suppressed information and who did make general disclosure requests at pretrial. Id. See
notes 102-105 supra and accompanying text.
188. See text accompanying notes 191-193 infra.
189. See text accompanying notes 197-201 inyra.
190. The lower courts have also considered weight and probative value and the effect of
cumulative evidence. See generally Comment, supra note 3.
191. See note 142 supra.
192. State v. Gillespie, 227 So. 2d at 556.
193. See note 142 supra and accompanying text.
194. 284 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973).
195. The officer testified that he had seen the white substance at the point of arrest. Id. at
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negative inference from a report was not sufficiently favorable to warrant disclosure.'"6
Materiality has, in some cases, depended on admissibility of the suppressed
evidence. 19 7 As previously discussed, some courts have held that evidence inadmissible at trial need not be disclosed by the prosecutor. 198 Other jurisdictions have rejected this view, however, relying on Justice Fortas' concurring
opinion in Giles v. Maryland, 99 which discredited the admissibility standard.
Recently, the Florida courts have moved toward a compromise on the admissibility requirement. Crawford signalled this trend by requiring disclosure
of material leading to the information sought by the defense, even though the
specific request for an FBI rap sheet was denied on the basis of inadmissibility.200 The court in State v. Coney similarly noted that although the specific
evidence sought by the defendant would be inadmissible at trial and hence not
subject to discovery, the state had a responsibility to disclose, upon request,
20 1
information that might lead to admissible evidence.
Destructionof Evidence and the Duty to Preserve
The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on the applicability of
20 2
Brady where the prosecution has destroyed or failed to preserve evidence.
Florida courts, however, have frequently confronted circumstances involving
the destruction of evidence. These cases have not established an explicit duty
to preserve evidence in Florida. Decisions in both the Florida supreme court
and the lower district courts of appeal, however, indicate that destruction of
evidence by the prosecution will be scrutinized closely by the courts to protect
20
defendants from prejudice incidental to that destruction or loss by the state. 3
2
In State v. SobelJ 0 the Florida supreme court recently found that a defendant was not denied due process where the contents of a lost or destroyed
tape recording would not have been beneficial to the accused. The supreme
court, however, required the state to demonstrate lack of prejudice to the
defendant rather than requiring the defendant to assume the burden of demonstrating prejudice. 20 5 In Salvatore v. State20 6 that court, again finding no due
process violation, stated that the level of prejudice mandating a new trial in a

196. Id. at 200.

197. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
198. See text accompanying notes 82-85 supra.
199. See note 42 supra.
200. Notably, this aspect of the Crawford decision is otherwise in conflict with the general
restrictive attitude of the decision toward criminal pretrial discovery. See note 87 supra and

accompanying text.
201. 294 So. 2d 82, 85 (Fla. 1974).
202. See Note, The Right to Independent Testing: A New Hitch in the Preservation of
Evidence Doctrine,75 COLUM. L. REv. 1355 (1975).
203. See generally Comment, supra note 117, which discusses the development of the
"duty to preserve" evidence in some state and federal jurisdictions.
204. 363 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1978). See text accompanying notes 114-118 supra.
205. 363 So. 2d at 328. See notes 114-118 supra and accompanying text.
206. 366 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1978).
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destruction of evidence case varies inversely with the degree to which funda2°7
mental fairness is violated.
As noted above, the burden of proof rests on the state in a destruction of
evidence situation. Conversely, the burden of proof lies with the defendant irf
a suppression of evidence situation under Brady or Agurs. By inference, the
destruction or loss of evidence by the state in any situation is presumptively
unfair and, accordingly, the state must show that it is not.
Lower courts have also considered destruction of evidence challenges. Several have suggested that there is a prosecutorial duty to preserve evidence. In
Farrellv. State,208 the First District Court of Appeal found a due process violation in the unintentional destruction of a tape recording of the transaction out
of which the defendant was charged.20 9 The defendant made a timely demand
for discovery. The court, rejecting the state's contention that destruction was
harmless because the tape recording was inadmissible, stated that the prosecutor should not make admissibility determinations. 210 Because the defendant
could demonstrate the contents and potential favorability of the tape, the de211
struction of the evidence was held to be reversible error.
Farrell relied to a great extent upon stipulated facts to rebut the state's
contention that the tape was not subject to disclosure under Brady. In Mitchell
v. State,21 2 the Second District Court of Appeal applied the strictest Agurs
materiality standard and found that when the defendant rebuts the state's
showing of nonprejudice, the destruction of the evidence required reversal of
the defendant's conviction. 213 The court found. that the accused's showing of

prejudice raised a reasonable doubt.2 4 In Budman v. State,21 5 the defendant
was unable to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the destruction of evidence.2 16 Nevertheless, the Third District Court of Appeal noted that the Brady
guarantee of prosecutorial disclosure was not limited to situations in which the
exact content of the information is known. Otherwise, the state could vitiate its
Brady duty through simple destruction of the evidence. The court warned
207. Id. at 751. In Salvatore, as in Sobel, the Florida supreme court found no violation of

a defendant's due process right to a fair trial when the state demonstrated a lack of prejudice
to the defendant from the destruction of evidence. Id.
208. 317 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1975).
209. Id. at 144.
210. Id. The court felt that the destruction or loss of demonstrably favorable evidence was
inexcusable and "must not and will not be permitted." Id. The court's statement regarding the
prosecutorial function in determining issues of admissibility in destruction of evidence cases
appears to parallel that in suppression cases. Although the state might initially decide
whether to disclose requested evidence still in its possession on the basis of admissibility, the

state's decision will ultimately be reviewed if contested by the defendant. If the state determines evidence is inadmissible and, on that consideration, destroys the evidence, the state's
decision will also be subject to review by the trial court.
211. 317 So. 2d at 144. The charges against the defendant were dismissed by the court.
212. 358 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1978).
213. Id. at 240-41. The defendant was able to show that voices on the tape were discernible and that the tape was potentially favorable.
214. 358 So. 2d at 241.

215. 362 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 3rd D.CA. 1978).
216. The defendant's conviction was affirmed. Id. at 1027.
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that its opinion should not be construed as sanctioning unauthorized, unilateral destruction of any discoverable matter. In a strong passage reflecting
the trend of the lower courts as to the destruction or loss of evidence, the Third
District Court of Appeal suggested a duty to preserve evidence: "We feel
strongly that the duty of disclosure is operative as a duty of preservation; only
217
then many meaningful discovery be possible later."
Rule 3.220
Under rule 3.220(a) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 21s the

prosecutor's obligation to disclose information to the defense is triggered by
either: (i) written demand by the defendant pursuant to rule 3.220(a)(1); 2 19
(ii) a showing of materiality to the preparation of the defense pursuant to rule
3.220(a)(5);220 or (iii) voluntary disclosure of information by the state which
22
tends to negate the guilt of the accused pursuant to rule 3.220(a)(2). 1
Rule 3.220(a) appears to parallel the Brady doctrine in several respects.
While rule 3.220(a)(1)'s specific time and request provisions reflect more formal
procedural discovery requirements, rule 3.220(a)(2) or (5) provide a separate
mechanism to compel a prosecutor to disclose evidence that meets either of two
different standards of materiality.
Rule 3.220(a)(2) provides for disclosure as soon as practicable "after indictment or information of any material information tending to negate the accused's guilt." The provision may be read to create a duty of voluntary dis217. Id. Notably, the court did not command state prosecutors to preserve evidence. While
the judicial statement was a strong warning that the court would closely analyze destruction of
evidence situations, the warnings given in other jurisdictions in the nation have been much
stricter in their demand not to destroy potentially favorable evidence. See generally Comment,
supra note 117.
In a subsequent case the Third District Court of Appeal noted that "the weight of authority in the country is that the destruction of suspect contraband drugs unavoidably consumed
during chemical testing by a state chemist does not constitute an act of suppression by the
state sufficient to trigger a due process violation." State v. Herrera, 365 So. 2d 399, 401 (Fla.
3rd D.C.A. 1978). In Herrera,the defendant filed a motion to dismiss an information charging
him with possession of heroin on the ground that the state had destroyed material evidence the heroin - and that such destruction violated his due process rights. The defendant sought
discovery of the heroin; his discovery motion was granted, but the heroin had already been
completely consumed by the state's chemical testing. On appeal by the state of the trial
court's order excluding the testimony of the state's chemist because of the destruction of the
evidence, the district court found the destruction unavoidable and remanded. The court
noted that if the drug had been negligently destroyed while tested or if, after testing, a remainder had been intentionally or negligently lost or destroyed "[a] different case would be
presented." Id.
218. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a) -Prosecutor's Obligation.
219. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a)(1). See note 232 infra.
220. FLA. R. CraM. P. 3.220(a)(5) provides: "Upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of the defense, the court may require such other discovery to defense counsel as justice
may require."
221. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a)(2) provides: "As soon as practicable after the filing of the
indictment or information the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense counsel any material
information within the State's possession or control which tends to negate the guilt of the

accused as to the offense charged."
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closure. Although limited by the work product and confidential informant
exceptions,22 2 the rule places the prosecutor in an affirmative disclosure role.
Agurs' third category also creates a duty of voluntary disclosure, but one
qualified by a "reasonable doubt" standard of materiality. Rule 3.220(a)(2)'s
materiality requirement, however, is less stringent than that of Agurs. The
standard in rule 3.220(a)(2) does not focus on reasonable doubt; rather, it
focuses on the probative value of a specific item of information. 223 Furthermore,
the evidence need not negate the accused's guilt, but can merely "tend to
negate it." Rule 3.220(a)(2)'s duty to disclose thus appears to create a potentially
useful procedural counterpart to the Brady/lgurs doctrine.24

Rule 3.220(a)(5) 25 may also provide a Brady-like disclosure device by providing for court-ordered disclosure of evidence "[material] to the preparation
of the defense." Such disclosure is necessary "as justice may require." Rule
3.220(a)(5) is the discovery rule counterpart to a specific Brady request situation.
Defense counsel in pursuit of information not specifically provided for by
rule 3.220(a)(1) might assert both a specific Brady motion and a rule 3.220(a)(5)
motion. With the latter, the standard of materiality is at least as lenient as that
of a Brady request. In fact, an accused might more easily meet the rule 3.220
(a)(5) "preparation of the defense" standard than that standard of favorability
to the accused on the issue of guilt or punishment reflected in Brady.226 The
latter standard, however, is wider in scope insofar as it extends to information
relevant to punishment, unlike the rule.2
SUGGESTIONS FOR EFFECTIVE USE OF THE
IN FLORIDA

Brady,DOCTRINE

Defense counsel in Florida can use the Brady doctrine to help effectuate
222. FLA. R. CRIm. P. 3.220(c) provides that work product and confidential informant
identities shall not be subject to disclosure: "(1) Work Product. Disclosure shall not be required of legal research or of records, correspondence, reports or memoranda, to the extent
that they contain the opinions, theories, or conclusions of the prosecuting or defense attorney,
or members of his legal staff. (2) Informants. Disclosure of a confidential informant shall not
be required unless the confidential informant is to be produced at a hearing or trial, or a
failure to disclose his identity will infringe the constitutional rights of the accused."
223. Agurs requires a review of the record in full. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
224. See note 105 supra.
225. See note 220 supra.
226. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
227. The Criminal Procedure Rules Committee of the Florida Bar considered the ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUsTIcE RELATING To DISCOVERY AND PROCEDuRE BEFORE TRIAL in
drafting its recommendations for the adoption of FLA. R. CaM. P., 3.220 in 1972. FLA. R. CRIM.
P. 3.220 is the successor of former FLA. R. CraM. P. 1.220 (1967). Part H of the ABA Standards
provides for "Disclosure to the Accused" and suggests automatic disclosure by the prosecutor
of all information within the prosecutor's knowledge except the work product materials and

the identity of confidential informants. The Committee adopted a substantial part of Part II,

including the suggested exceptions. The ABA Standards suggestion of automatic disclosure
was not accepted. Despite the rejection of some of the provisions of the ABA Standards, the

underlying policy appears to have been accepted. Thus, "broad pretrial disclosure of the
prosecutor's case [is] the key to satisfying procedural objectives of overriding significance to
criminal justice." ABA House of Delegates, Oversight Committee, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JusTcE RELATING TO DIscovERY AND PROCEDURE BEFoRE TRIAL
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broad disclosure in criminal proceedings. Initially, demands for Brady material
should be filed for specifically defined information.22s Specificity in requests
can be developed in the pretrial period through concurrent use of alternative
discovery techniques that produce information indicating the existence of information available only under the constitutional disclosure doctrine.2 - 29
Specific requests give notice to the prosecutor and increase the chance that a
23 0
reviewing court will apply the lower standard of materiality of Agurs
Defense counsel should use rule 3.220 of the Florida Rules of Criminal
Procedure liberally but carefully.231 That discovery rule requires less specificity
than an effective Brady request and can be used to gain much of the information needed by the defense to prepare for trial.232 However, rule 3.220 demands
228. See The Prosecutor'sDuty, supra note 5, at 705. See also BERNSTEIN, supra note 51,
§23.02[4].
229. See, e.g., McCants v. State, 363 So. 2d 362 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1978) (Ervin, J., dissenting),
where a deponent refused to reveal the identity of a confidential informant. Id. at 363. The
deposition was temporarily adjourned on defendant's motion to disclose the informant's
identity and reconvened in the court's presence to comply with FLA. R. GRIM. P. 3.2200). Id.
at 365. That provision provides for appropriate sanctions to be imposed by the trial court for
failure of a party to comply with an applicable discovery rule. The majority upheld the trial
court's order denying discovery on the rationale of Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53
(1957). The court also found Agurs inapplicable. The dissent criticized the majority's interpretation of Roviaro, and asserted that "the informer's identity here was material in
determining the guilt or innocence of defendant ..
" Id. at 366. While the dissent did not
quote expressly from Brady or Agurs in support of this proposition, it is apparent that the
dissent's rationale would support a theory that the constitutional duty to disclose might require the production of a confidential informant's name. FiA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(c)(2)'s exemption of confidential informants also indicates this rationale by stating that disclosure (of
identity) is not required unless such failure to disclose "infringe[s] the constitutional rights
of the accused." See also Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957): "[W]here the
disclosure of an informant's identity ... is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused,
or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way."
230. See notes 156-161 supra and accompanying text.
231. See note 218-238 supra and accompanying text.
232. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a)(1) provides for discovery in broad categories of information,
including the names and addresses of persons who may have relevant information and the
statements of those persons; all sections of police reports (with limitations; see note 87 supra);
written or recorded statements of the accused and co-defendants; grand jury testimony of the
accused; whether there has been confidential informant activity, wiretapping or other electronic surveillance, or search or seizure; expert reports; and tangible papers or objects either
of the accused or that otherwise will be used at a hearing or a trial. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b)
provides for disclosure to the prosecution of a more limited but nonetheless liberal range of
information held by the accused.
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220 has been judicially enforced through the doctrine enunciated in
Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971). See also Wilcox v. State, 367 So. 2d 1020
(Fla. 1979). Thus, the trial court has discretion to determine whether noncompliance with
rule 3.220 results in harm or prejudice to a defendant. That discretion can be properly exercised only after the court has made an adequate inquiry into all the surrounding circumstances. The inquiry should determine whether the state's violation was willful or inadvertent, whether the violation was trivial or substantial, and what effect, if any, the noncompliance had upon the defendant's ability to prepare for trial. Richardson v. State, 246
So. 2d at 775. The Florida supreme court noted in Cumbie v. State, 345 So. 2d 1061, 1962 (Fla.
1977) that there must be an affirmative showing of nonprejudice in a case of noncompliance,
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should be filed concurrently with specific Brady requests. 23 3 Brady disclosure
demands should be directed to information unlikely to be produced by the
state under rule 3.220, such as identities of confidential informants. 234 If the
prosecution fails to comply with the initial rule 3.220 or Brady requests, defense counsel might re-fie its Brady demands or move that the court compel
disclosure. This would maintain the visibility of the disclosure request before
both the court and the prosecutor and avoid potential waiver of requests for
information. Furthermore, rule 3.220(a)(5) 23 5 motions requesting "such other
discovery ... as justice may require" might also be filed for disclosure by the
court order to obtain evidence less likely to have been disclosed by the state.
Finally, should the defense at any point in the proceedings suspect that new
evidence has been uncovered and not disclosed, such disclosure might be
prompted through rule 3.220(f)'s continuous duty to disclose provision in conjunction with a specific Brady demand.236
To provide an alternative vehicle to gain information which the defense
cannot anticipate with any specificity, a broad Brady request for favorable and
material evidence in each of the major information categories applicable to the
case should be made early in the pretrial period. The categories listed in rule
3.220(a)(1), in addition to the exception categories of rule 3.220(c), can serve
237
as a blueprint for such broad disclosure requests.
As a tactical matter, a defense attorney in an early stage of the proceedings
should make a trial court aware of the constitutional basis and policies underlying the Brady demand. 238 By specifying the due process considerations behind
239
Brady disclosure, the defense can differentiate Brady from procedural devices.
The defense might also ease the trial court's indecision by demonstrating in its
Brady demand that the information sought is actually material to a defense to
be used. Furthermore, the Brady request should indicate with all possible
precision the probable location of the information sought to counter state
arguments that the prosecutor should not have to comb through files for Brady
40
material.2
With the application of these tactical maneuvers and the filing of the most
specific Brady demand possible, the likelihood of success in obtaining criminal
pretrial disclosure may be dramatically increased. 241 Because the Brady duty is
or the case must be reversed. The burden to establish the nonprejudice is on the party who
violated the discovery rule. See, e.g., Lavigne v. State, 849 So. 2d 178, 179 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977).
23. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See note 222 supra.
See note 220 supra.
See note 109 supra.
See notes 222, 229 & 232 supra.

238 See BmRqS~MN, supranote 51, §23.02[1].
239. Arguably, such differentiation provides a trial court with optional grounds for a

favorable pretrial disclosure order.
240. See note 178 supra and accompanying text. Such a compelled search might be useful
to the defendant, but it is unlikely to be ordered by the court; furthermore, the court is un-

likely to conduct a search itself.
241. Another plausible tactical device to seek favorable disposition by the trial court is to
gain an evidentiary hearing for the disclosure determination. This hearing might be in camera.
See notes 147-148 supra. See FLA. R. Cm. P. 3.220(i): "In Camera Proceedings. Upon request
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a continuing one, 242 defense counsel should be alert to assert Brady motions
throughout the trial and post-trial setting. Assertion of Brady motions challenging the state's failure to respond to previous Brady and procedural disclosure demands must be carefully but continuously asserted for effective disclosure. Defense counsel must watch for and anticipate the existence of useful
information innocently held by the state which is subject to a specific Brady
request. Thus, the state can be forced to disclose newly found evidence and the
appellate record can be established in instances of nondisclosure. 243
CONCLUSION

Brady doctrine requirements impose difficult disclosure duties on the
prosecutor and the courts. The prosecutor must make an initial decision to
withhold information or to disclose it either directly to the defendant or indirectly to the trial court. 244 The trial court or the appellate court must decide

when certain information must be disclosed or when a defendant has been
sufficiently prejudiced by nondisclosure to warrant relief. Issues of judicial
expediency may affect the trial court's decision.245
The essential difficulty lies in deciding which information is of such
favorable, material value to be subject to disclosure under the Agurs standards.
Few problems arise in instances of deliberate use of perjured testimony by the
state. However, the determination of when suppressed impeachment evidence
constitutes perjury, 246 the degree of specificity necessary to invoke the lower
Agurs materiality standard under category two, 247 and at what point informa-

tion is so materially favorable as to warrant reversal of a conviction absent a
defense request, 248 prove elusive to both court and prosecutor. Unfortunately,
Florida's Brady case law demonstrates an ad hoc approach to disclosure problems that provides no real guidelines for prosecutorial or defense expectation.
A uniform application of the Agurs standards of materiality might develop
certainty in Brady disclosure situations similar to that existing under rule
3.220. The broad drafting of that rule suggests that a primary objective in
Florida's discovery scheme is liberal prosecutorial disclosure. The Brady doc-

of any person, the court may permit any showing of cause for denial or regulation of disclosures, or any portion of such showing to be made in camera.... [T]he entire record of
such showing shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court, to be made available
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal."
242. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107-109 (1976).
243. The Brady doctrine offers numerous opportunities to furnish an appeal point.
Crucial to this strategy, however, is the necessity of establishing an adequate written record
for appeal. Written Brady demands, motions, and proposed orders can help accomplish this
task. See BERNSm-N,supra note 51, §23.03[6].
244. Prosecutorial discretion whether to approach the defendant or the court with the
information might be modified by the use of a pretrial conference. See FLA. R. CuaM. P.
3.220(2).
245. See note 146 supra.
246. See text accompanying notes 181-183 supra.
247. See note 187 supra.
248. See note 142 supraand accompanying text (Florida application).
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